Shipyard Expansion Deep Dive

Program Decision Lock (Current Plan)

• Active build strategy uses 3 new major GOCO yards only (Mare Island, Sparrows Point, Brownsville). No separate regional GOCO program is funded in the current plan.
• 4 existing GOGO/Navy-run yards are funded at $1B each with fixed allocation: 10% cleanup, 10% training/housing, 25% mission modernization, and 50% TriSeadon lane/drydock/pier/lab-shop buildout, with each yard sized around one large TriSeadon lane rather than a medium lane.
• 5-10 existing COCO/private yards are eligible for up to $500M each in federal loans at a 3% program rate over 20 years with Year-1 no-payment startup, plus lane-availability covenants; refit-only sites can use a smaller reduced-funding package.
• All four yard types (GOGO, GOCO, COCO, ISO/module) ramp simultaneously under one national schedule; initial production pacing starts at 2 FFG in Year 1 and 2 FFG in Year 2.
• Program production assumptions: FFG 24 months, DDG 48 months, and CAG 60 months from first steel to delivery under stabilized flow.
• All 50 states are offered participation in the state module-campus program, including states that already host GOCO, GOGO, or COCO yards; states may opt in at launch or join later.
• DLA storage and distribution functions can be assigned within GOCO/GOGO/COCO/state campuses and do not require a separate stand-alone yard program.
• Capital recovery rule: GOCO capital is recoverable through lease/use revenue and lower per-hull cost, COCO capital is recoverable through 3% loan repayment over 20 years, and state module-campus capital is split through contractor lease/rent streams for the first 10 years or until the initial public capital is recovered.
• Rights baseline: new TriSeadon development RFPs establish U.S. government ownership or equivalent controlling rights in foreground IP and the reproducible production package; privately funded legacy background IP is not confiscated, and contractors and yards build accepted work to one controlled technical baseline.

1) Assumptions and Yard-Cost Drivers

• GOCO model cost behavior: lower effective margins via lease-income structure.
• Legacy yard cost behavior: lowest hull cost baseline (time and materials).
• Private yard cost behavior: slightly higher costs offset by low-interest loan support.
• DLA bulk-buy effect: about 10-15 percent per-hull reductions on key systems.
• ISO/node pre-outfitting effect: about 8-10 percent labor reduction.
• Standardized shared systems (IMM/IWM/Cerberus/radars/powerplants) reduce design churn.
• Program discipline effect: TriSeadon targets lower recurring cost by freezing the technical baseline early, limiting major new technology insertions by flight, and shifting future change into modules, planned refits, and controlled block upgrades rather than post-start redesign.

Open the full ship-cost and tonnage comparison in Cost

2) Construction Timing, Yard Flow, and DLA Support

• FFG timing baseline: legacy frigate construction has tended to run around 36 months or more; TriSeadon targets about 24 months once yard flow is stabilized.
• DDG timing baseline: current large destroyers can run around 72 months from first steel to delivery; TriSeadon targets about 48 months by using larger parallelized yards, pre-outfitted modules, and fewer post-start design changes.
• CAG timing baseline: large cruiser-scale analogs historically run 5 or more years; TriSeadon targets about 60 months because the hull is large but the build logic is meant to be disciplined and repetitive rather than bespoke.
• Yard logic: major shipyards handle erection, launch, combat-system integration, test, commissioning, and deep refit, while the distributed module network keeps fabrication moving in parallel.
• DLA support logic: DLA-backed inventory, set-down storage, and scheduled delivery keep steel, launcher hardware, sensors, propulsion components, and accepted modules flowing to the yards when the receiving lane is ready.
• Schedule argument: TriSeadon does not claim faster delivery from wishful thinking. It claims faster delivery from fewer redesign pauses, more pre-outfitting, more lanes, and a supply architecture designed to keep shipyards building instead of waiting.

Open Logistics Line | Open Build and Refit Schedule

3) Ship-Cost Comparison Lives in Cost

The detailed tonnage, historical analog, current U.S. comparator, and TriSeadon recurring-cost comparison has been consolidated into the Cost page so affordability stays in one place.

Open Ship Cost and Comparative Summary

5) Shipyard Network from Expansion Document

6) DLA Supply Chain Model

• Central procurement model: DLA government purchasing plus a civilian procurement counterpart that runs competitive sourcing lanes for approved vendors.
• Module yards draw approved materials and interfaces from either the DLA lane or the qualified civilian counterpart lane, but both feed one controlled baseline.
• Payment and contractor scoring are tied to accepted finished modules, not simply to labor spent or partial fabrication progress.
• DLA acceptance is the release point: interface fit, quality records, configuration control, and documentation package all have to clear before payment and points post.
• DLA role: strategic reserve management, long-lead industrial stabilization, and assured supply continuity during disruption.
• DLA scope covers steel, turbines, generators, sensors, launcher hardware, boats, vehicles, aviation support equipment, fuel-system hardware, and other common shipset items, with controlled weapons components routed through cleared lines under the same program demand signal.
• Civilian counterpart role: capitalist competition, commercial price benchmarking, and recurring recompete pressure to control lifecycle cost.
• Keep-building rule: DLA-backed stocks and vendor alternates exist so a late shipment or single-vendor shortfall does not stop work across the yard network.
• Accepted modules are either pushed just in time to the yard most likely to consume them next or held in DLA set-down/storage positions as surge and war-reserve inventory.
• DLA continuously slows, accelerates, or changes module output by class and type so the state-campus network follows actual build starts, refits, and reserve demand.
• DLA is also the delivery traffic manager for major government-furnished equipment, ensuring the right steel, sensors, modules, and controlled shipset items arrive when the receiving lane is ready.
• Bulk strategy: 10-20 shipsets purchased per cycle with 10-15 percent economy effect targets.
• Domestic steel expansion requirement: naval-grade mill capacity growth via federal loan tools.
• Official current DLA Distribution baseline (as of March 2, 2026): 17 CONUS and 7 OCONUS distribution locations.
• West baseline correction: DLA Distribution San Joaquin (Tracy, CA) is the West Coast core distribution node (not Mare Island).
• TriSeadon policy update: no new stand-alone DLA yards are required for baseline supply support; existing DLA footprint provides capacity now.
• 50-state storage integration remains optional mission designation inside existing yards for surge buffering, not a requirement to create additional DLA yard sites.
• Strategic reserve baseline: 10 FFG + 8 DDG + 3 CAG shipsets (21 total), plus a separately calculated rotating repair and refit float. Open the detailed DLA inventory objective.
• Reserve-use policy: end-of-program reserve can extend production by roughly 1-2 additional years when authorized.
• Golden rule: if reserve posture and build schedule conflict, builds continue and yards do not idle.
• Funding profile: sustainment and inventory posture use existing DLA network capacity first; expansion spending is conditional and not baseline-required.
• Distributed production role: state and module campuses can produce long-lead non-sensitive parts, missile-support subassemblies, structural units, cable sets, cooling hardware, and similar fabrication-heavy items while cleared primes retain warheads, guidance, seekers, electronics, and final controlled integration.

7) Financial Picture

• GOCO major yards (3 x $5B): ~$15.0B federal capital (recoverable through lease/use revenue over time).
• GOGO yards (4 x $1B): ~$4.0B direct federal spend for mission readiness and TriSeadon lane activation.
• COCO/private yards (5-10 sites, up to $500M each): ~$2.5B-$5.0B federal loan exposure (recoverable by loan repayment at 3% program rate over 20 years after Year-1 payment holiday).
• 50-state campuses (all states): the baseline planning picture carries up to about ~$7.5B federal core match plus up to about ~$7.5B state-side core capital if every state activates at the top end of the campus package, with outside grant and assistance programs layered on top.
• State module-campus recovery model: state and federal shares split contractor lease/rent streams for the first 10 years, or until the initial public capital is recovered. After that, the state receives 100% of contractor lease/rent streams and the campus remains with the state.
• DLA funding is mission-designation and storage/distribution enablement inside the yard network, not a separate stand-alone yard category.
• Gross federal commitment baseline: ~$26.5B-$29.0B (excluding additional optional overlays).
• Net federal long-run impact: materially lower than gross outlay as GOCO, COCO, and state-campus recovery streams mature.

8) Expansion Timeline Phases

• 2026-2029: first COCO lanes and initial module-campus activations online; early cleanup, training, and module production capacity expands.
• 2028-2032: Mare Island, Sparrows Point, and Brownsville CAG/DDG/FFG build-refit lanes phase online; legacy and COCO lane modernization expands.
• 2030-2035: all-state yard network complete, GOGO mission-modernization fully integrated, and COCO participation scaled under covenant compliance.
• 2035 onward demand-reconciled structure: 38 DDG/FFG medium build lanes, 8 DDG/FFG medium refit lanes, 10 CAG large build lanes, and 3 large refit lanes, with Norfolk and Puget carrying CAG-capable large-lane envelopes while Portsmouth remains a sovereign overhaul/surge yard and Pearl Harbor remains a large refit-only yard.

8A) Lane Reconciliation (Current Chronology Demand)

• Peak build demand from current chronology board: FFG BL 12, DDG BL 24, CAG BL 9.
• This requires a 38-medium and 10-large build posture if the program wants added overbuild margin while still preserving dedicated refit space.
• Physical lane rule used: 1 build drydock + 2 build piers = 3 concurrent ship lanes; therefore 2 drydocks = 6 lanes.
• Minimum build infrastructure implied by 12/24/9 demand: FFG 4 medium drydocks + 8 medium piers; DDG 8 medium drydocks + 16 medium piers; CAG 3 large drydocks + 6 large piers.
• Total minimum build infrastructure: 15 build drydocks and 30 build piers.
• Peak refit demand from current chronology board: FFG RL 3, DDG RL 3, CAG RL 2.
• Refit planning rule: standard fleet refits use a 90-day authorized planning window containing a 74-day work schedule and a 16-day margin for delay, rework, weather, retest, and return-to-service work. Major refit is an exception and may take longer.
• At the standard 90-day refit window, this still requires only about 6 medium refit lanes plus 2 large refit lanes for the modeled peak demand; plan therefore carries margin at 8 medium and 3 large refit lanes.
• Installed lane totals under this allocation: 38 medium build, 10 large build, 8 medium refit, 3 large refit.

Allocation by yard groups: GOCO major = core large-hull and medium-hull build throughput; legacy = CAG-capable large-lane envelopes at Norfolk and Puget plus sovereign overhaul/surge support at Portsmouth and large refit-only coverage at Pearl Harbor; COCO/private yards (including Marinette lane capacity) provide rotating floating openings, optional single-lane refit support, and surge or foreign-sales expansion above the core baseline. The controlling rule is that build lanes can absorb refit work in war or disruption, but dedicated refit lanes are not assumed to generate equivalent new-build throughput.

9) Continuity and Governance Notes

• Performance control model: GOCO lease-point accountability (on-time/on-budget gains, late/over-budget penalties).
• Cost-governance expansion: on-time/on-budget completion earns positive points; ahead/under-budget earns bonus points; behind/over-budget earns negative points.
• Bid and workshare linkage: high-score contractors gain bid priority and nationwide expansion eligibility; low-score contractors lose workshare and can lose contracts.
• Cross-training credits: contractors and yards earn additional points for cross-training workers from other yards and partner contractors.
• Reference implementation table: Contractor Points Matrix.
• Resilience model: multi-stream competition across GOCO, Navy-run legacy, and private lanes.
• Procurement governance update: DLA remains core government broker, but a civilian procurement counterpart is added to enforce ongoing price competition and avoid single-channel buying lock.
• Workforce model: expansion into new labor markets, plus cross-yard training mobility.
• Environmental model: brownfield-first and day-1 cleanup remains mandatory across GOCO, GOGO, COCO, module, and DLA expansions.
• Site continuity note: this page preserves the expansion document baseline; Yards shows the integrated current-network view used across the rest of the website.

9B) GOCO Vendor Model and National Growth Rules

• Ownership and control rule: all GOCO yards remain U.S. government-owned and government-controlled facilities.
• Vendor operating model: contractors lease labs, shops, and production spaces inside GOCO yards instead of owning the yard.
• Rent treatment rule: lease/rent charges may be offset against future ship costs when authorized by contract, or may be billed separately by policy year.
• Points-to-expansion rule: contractors that sustain strong scorecards (under budget, on/ahead of schedule, quality compliance) can expand footprint in the same GOCO yard or in other national/state GOCO yards.
• Poor-performance rule: contractors with failing points performance cannot expand and may lose space allocation or future workshare.
• Market concentration cap: no single vendor may control more than 50% of leasable production space in any one GOCO yard at any time.
• Graduation path: if a contractor outgrows the GOCO cap, the preferred path is to open or expand a COCO yard and free GOCO space for new entrants.
• Barrier-to-entry rule: vendors can enter by leasing a single space in one yard for one defined task, then scale based on earned performance points.
• National industrial objective: broaden contractor participation across all 50 states to increase distributed shipbuilding and repair capacity.
• Workforce mobility model: every GOCO yard includes a training center and temporary housing to support cross-yard staffing, cross-training, and skill transfer.
• National accreditation rule: training outcomes and technical qualifications are tracked under a common accreditation framework recognized across the yard network.
• Knowledge-sharing rule: cross-training and standards-based technology transfer are incentivized through the points system to raise national baseline capability.

9A) Risk and Mitigation Clause Set (GoGo and COCO)

Objective: make participation practical, auditable, and enforceable while protecting mission readiness and taxpayer value.

10) Full Extract (Complete Document Coverage)

Note: The extract below preserves original document wording for audit traceability. Where extract figures differ, the controlling baseline for this site is the Program Decision Lock above (4-yard GOGO allocation lock, 3-yard GOCO $5B lock, COCO 10/15/35 allocation lock, and 1% state-note recovery model).

1. Assumptions (Post–Industrial Base Build-Out)
	•	FFG: 500 ft OAL × 66 ft beam × approximately 10,000 tons
	•	DDG: 650 ft OAL × 88 ft beam × approximately 15,000 tons
	•	CAG: 800 ft OAL × 108 ft beam × approximately 32,000 tons
Cost Drivers
	•	Yard efficiency gains:
	•	GOCO model = reduced profit margins (lease revenue substitutes some profit).
	•	Legacy yards = lowest cost (time + materials only).
	•	Private yards = slightly higher, but offset by loan assistance.
	•	DLA bulk buys: –10 to –15% per hull (steel, turbines, radars, VLS, pods).
	•	ISO & Node yards: Pre-outfitting cuts labor ~8–10%.
	•	Standardization across classes: Shared IMMs, IWMs, Cerberus mounts, radars, powerplants = reduced design churn.

2. Construction Time per Class
	•	FFG:
	•	Legacy US builds: ~36 months.
	•	TriSeadon modular method: 24 months per hull (parallel outfitting, JIT supply).
	•	DDG:
	•	Legacy Arleigh Burke Flight III: ~72 months.
	•	TriSeadon: 48 months per hull (fewer design changes, larger yards, modular inserts).
	•	CAG:
	•	Comparable to CGN/large CVN auxiliaries (5+ years historically).
	•	TriSeadon: 60 months per hull (standardized heavy-lift modules, fewer bespoke systems).

3. Cost per Ship (2025–2035 $ Estimates)
Baseline: Current U.S. Programs
	•	FFG-62: ~$1.4–1.6B each (and slipping higher).
	•	DDG-51 Flight III: ~$2.2–2.5B each.
	•	CG/large combatants: ~$6–7B if built today.
TriSeadon Adjusted Costs
	•	FFG: ~$1.25B → $1.0–1.1B each
	•	Savings: DLA steel bulk buy ($50–70M), GOCO/legacy margin cut (~$50–100M).
	•	DDG: ~$2.5B → $2.0–2.2B each
	•	Savings: Bulk VLS buys ($100–150M), standardized radar/powerplant (~$100M).
	•	CAG: ~$6B → $4.5–5.0B each
	•	Savings: Scale on steel & power ($250–300M), module standardization (~$200M).

4. Comparative Summary
Class
Displacement
Build Time
Legacy Cost (est.)
TriSeadon Cost
% Savings
FFG
~7,500t
24 mo
$1.4–1.6B
$1.0–1.1B
20–30%
DDG
~15,000t
48 mo
$2.2–2.5B
$2.0–2.2B
10–15%
CAG
~32,000t
60 mo
$6–7B
$4.5–5.0B
20–25%

✅ Bottom Line
	•	FFGs: Big winners — TriSeadon beats the troubled FFG-62 program by ~$400–600M per hull and delivers 1/3 faster.
	•	DDGs: Slightly cheaper but much faster — cutting 2 years off build cycle keeps fleet numbers up.
	•	CAGs: Still expensive, but $1.5–2B cheaper than comparable legacy cruisers; standardized modules make sustainment easier.
The real gain isn’t just per-hull cost but throughput: with parallel lanes, ISO nodes, and DLA buffers, the Navy avoids bottlenecks that have plagued every major program since the Cold War.


A. National “Capital” GOCO Yards (2 total, $5B each)
1. Mare Island, Vallejo, CA (West Coast)
	•	Ownership: Former Navy shipyard (federal land, much of it transferred to Vallejo but could potentially be re-acquired by federal action, purchase or land swap and congressional approval). 
	•	Footprint: ~1,400 acres (ample for 3 graving docks, 5 slipways, 5 piers, large module halls, storage).
	•	Infrastructure: Legacy drydock basins already exist, though major modernization required; deep-water access via San Pablo Bay.
	•	Capacity: 1 × Large (CAG) build lane, 1 × large refit dock, 2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build lanes.
	•	Workforce: Bay Area + Central Valley, legacy shipyard labor pool, strong regional tech base.
	•	Investment: ~$5B modernization to create a full capital yard and cover Brownfield cleanup.
	•	Risk: Requires re-acquisition from City of Vallejo (political and legal complexity).
	•	Pros: Historic Navy site, proven deepwater, potential flagship yard west of Mississippi.
2. Port of Brownsville, TX (Gulf Coast)
	•	Ownership: ~40,000 acres controlled by Port of Brownsville (public navigation district).
	•	Candidate Parcel: ~302 acres currently marketed for industrial/maritime use (unpriced, but likely $15M–$60M based on comps).
	•	Infrastructure: 17-mile channel, ~42 ft draft (authorized deepening to 52 ft), on-dock rail, barge and truck access.
	•	Capacity: 1 × CAG build lane, 1 × large refit dock, 2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build lanes.
	•	Investment: ~$5B for graving docks, Goliath cranes, module halls, logistics facilities. Hurricane hardening (N+1 power, onsite gen, surge protections
	•	Pros: Massive publicly owned port land; deepwater access; large labor pool from Gulf Coast ship/energy industries.
	•	Cons: Politically sensitive to repurpose land from a thriving commercial port; would require federal–state negotiation or federally driven reallocation.

B. Regional GOCO Yards (3 total, $3B each, except Marinette at $1B)
3. Marinette, WI (Great Lakes)
	•	Ownership: Formerly federal (BRAC); now operated by Fincantieri Marinette Marine. Could potentially be re-acquired via negotiated settlement.
	•	Footprint: ~300 acres, proven DDG/FFG new construction yard.
	•	Capacity: 2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build lanes, 1 × medium refit.
	•	Investment: ~$1B for modernization into modular GOCO.
	•	Pros: Experienced shipbuilding workforce, existing infrastructure.
	•	Cons: Currently under private control—would require federal reacquisition.
	•	Possible replacements if Fincantieri won’t settle: NCBC Gulfport MS, Lake Charles, LA
4. Radio Island, Morehead City, NC (East Coast)
	•	Ownership: ~154 acres state-owned under NC Ports (within a 200-acre port complex). Expandable via dredge fill.
	•	Depth: 45–47 ft channel at Beaufort Inlet, no air-draft limits.
	•	Capacity: 2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build lanes, 1 × medium refit, ISO/module support.
	•	Investment: ~$3B for slips, drydocks, and module halls.
	•	Workforce: Eastern NC labor pool (Onslow, Craven, Pitt Counties); strong pipeline from MCAS Cherry Point (≈3,800+ civilians/military) and Camp Lejeune (≈6,000+ civilians) for skilled trades.
	•	Pros: Public/state-controlled land; fewer existing conflicts than Charleston.
	•	Cons: Requires cooperation from NC Ports and state government; some dredging/land reclamation needed.
5. Port Tampa Bay, FL (Southeast)
	•	Ownership: Hillsborough County Port Authority (public).
	•	Footprint: ~1,000 acres industrial land, with parcels suitable for 250+ acres dedicated to shipyard. (portoftampa.com)
	•	Depth: 43 ft today, with federal project to deepen to ~47 ft under way. (portoftampa.com)
	•	Capacity: 2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build lanes, 1 × Medium (DDG/FFG) refit, ample space for ISO/module shops and logistics staging.
	•	Workforce: Tampa/St. Petersburg metro area (~3.2M population) provides a large, relatively untapped industrial and veteran workforce.
	•	Pros: Public ownership (no private eminent domain); major port with planned deepening; large workforce outside existing Navy shipbuilding hubs.
	•	Cons: Shared with commercial and cruise shipping—would need careful site selection and coordination to avoid disruption.


1. National Shipyard Expansion
A. New GOCO Capital Yards (Flagships – $5B each)
Mare Island Vallejo CA & Brownsville Tx
	•	Land: Former Navy/industrial bases; re-aquired under federal control.
	•	Lanes:
	•	1 × Large (CAG/DDG/FFG) build
	•	1 × Large refit (CAG/DDG/FFG)
	•	2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build
	•	Cranes: 600-ton Goliaths at each lane
	•	Cost: $5B each.
	•	Timeline: 2026–2032.
	•	ROI: 2–3% lease = $100–150M/yr per yard (perpetual lease income).
	•	Governance: Navy retains control; vendors lease lanes. Performance points system: on-time/under budget = +points (expand contracts); late/over budget = –points (risk replacement).

B. New GOCO Regional Yards ($3B each, Marinette $1B)
Tampa Bay FL, Radio Island NC, Marinette (WI)
	•	Land:
	•	Tampa Bay/ Radio Island: State Port Authority/DoD property.
	•	Marinette: transferred from Fincantieri under forfeiture settlement (yard acquired free; Navy invests $1B modernization).
	•	Lanes:
	•	2 × Medium (DDG/FFG) build
	•	1 × Medium refit (DDG/FFG)
	•	Cranes: 600-ton Goliaths per lane.
	•	Cost: $3B each (Charleston, Ingleside); $1B (Marinette).
	•	Timeline: 2026–2031.
	•	ROI: $60–90M/yr lease per yard.
	•	Governance: Same performance point system as capital GOCO yards.

C. Legacy Navy Yards (Navy-Run, Direct Federal Spend)
Norfolk (VA), Portsmouth (ME), Puget Sound (WA), Pearl Harbor (HI)
	•	Lanes:
	•	Norfolk: 1x Full CAG-Capable Large Lane + Medium Throughput Support
	•	Portsmouth: 1x Medium Build (DDG/FFG)
	•	Puget Sound: 1x Full CAG-Capable Large Lane + Medium Throughput Support
	•	Pearl Harbor: 1x Medium Build (DDG/FFG) + refit support
	•	Cranes: 600-ton Goliaths per lane.
	•	Cost: 4 × $1B = $4B.
	•	Timeline: 2027–2035.
	•	ROI: No income, lowest cost hulls (time + materials, no margin) overtime ROI.
	•	Strategic Role: Baseline comparison for GOCO/private yards; training pipelines; nuclear/CVN/SSN sustainment.

D. Private Yards (Loan-Assisted Expansion)
	•	Sites: 10 (Gulf, Great Lakes, East, West) — excluding DDG-51 program yards.
	•	Lanes: 1x Medium (DDG/FFG) build and/or 1x Medium (DDG/FFG) refit lane with 1x 600t crane.
	•	Cost: $500M each = $5B total.
	•	Funding: 1% fixed federal loans, repayment begins after first hull.
	•	Timeline: 2027–2035.
	•	ROI: Net-neutral — ~$5.75B repaid on $5B loans.
	•	Strategic Role: Widens base, creates control factors to measure against GOCO/legacy performance, uses skilled contractors to set training and skills for other yards.

E. ISO & Module Yards (State Partnerships)
	•	Sites: 20 across 20 states.
	•	Scale: 5–20 acre facilities.
	•	Products: ISO pods, berthing nodes, Cerberus CIWS mounts
	•	Cranes: Container cranes/forklifts only.
	•	Cost: $250M each = $5B total.
	•	50/50 split: $2.5B federal loan @2% + $2.5B state/local.
	•	Timeline: 2026–2030.
	•	ROI: Loan fully repaid (~$2.9B). States keep jobs; federal cost ~0.
	•	Strategic Role: Expands political footprint to 20+ states; keeps module supply distributed.

2. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Supply Chain Model
A. Central Procurement
	•	DLA = single buyer of steel, engines, turbines, radars, VLS, batteries, IMMs, IWMs, Odyssey pods, Cerberus CIWS, DEW.
	•	Buys 10–20 shipsets at a time; reduces cost 10–15%.
	•	Steel requires new domestic naval-grade mills (Midwest/South). Federal loans finance upgrades.
B. Depots & Logistics
	•	4 regional depots:
	•	East Coast (Norfolk/Philly)
	•	Gulf Coast (Mobile/Ingalls)
	•	West Coast (SF Bay Area)
	•	Midwest (Great Lakes/Marinette)
	•	Store shipsets, modules, ISOs; deliver JIT to yards.
C. Strategic Inventory Doctrine
	•	Baseline: 10 FFG + 8 DDG + 3 CAG shipsets (21 ships), plus a separately calculated rotating repair and refit float.
	•	Golden Rule: If inventory vs build conflicts → build wins. No yard sits idle.
	•	Scale-up:
	•	2026–30: 2–3 FFG + 1–2 DDG sets.
	•	2030–35: 5 FFG + 5 DDG + 2 CAG.
	•	2035+: steady 10/10/4 floor.
D. Funding
	•	2026–30: $3–4B (steel mill loans, depot builds, turbine contracts).
	•	2030+: $1.5–2.5B annually (sustain reserves + active builds).
	•	Steel mill loans repaid at 2–3%.

3. Financial Picture
Category
Sites
Cost
ROI/Repayments
Net Federal Impact
New GOCO Flagships
2
$10B
$200–300M/yr lease
$10B
New GOCO Regionals
3
$7B
$180–270M/yr lease
$7B
Legacy Navy Yards
5
$6B
None (cheapest hulls)
$6B
Private Yards
10
$5B loans
~$5.75B repaid
≈0
ISO/Module Yards
20
$2.5B fed loans + $2.5B states
~$2.9B repaid
≈0
Steel Mills & Depots
—
$3–4B loans
Repaid at 2–3%
≈0
Gross Federal Outlay: ~$31–32B
Repayments: ~$11–12B
Net Federal Cost: ~$19–21B over 6–8 years
Ongoing Lease ROI: ~$380–570M/yr (GOCO yards)

4. Timeline (Phases)
	•	2026–2029: Marinette online (2 FFG lanes). ISO yards in first 10 states. Tampa/Radio construction.
	•	2028–2032: Mare Island, Sparrows Point, and Brownsville (GoCo heavy build/refit) phase online. Tampa/Radio DDG lanes open. First legacy yards (VA, ME, WA) online.
	•	2030–2035: Pearl Harbor DDG/FFG lane active with refit support. All ISO yards finished. Private yard expansions complete.
	•	2035+: Full national capacity online: ~14 DDG/FFG buildways, 10 DDG/FFG drydocks, 2–3 CAG docks, 17 fit-out berths. Steady state: 8 FFG/yr, 6 DDG/yr, 2 CAG/yr + parallel refits.

✅ Why This Works
	•	Control: GOCO yards federally owned — Navy can swap out poor performers without losing capacity.
	•	Performance Management: Lease point system enforces accountability (On-Time/On-Budget = rewarded; late/over = penalized).
	•	Redundancy & Competition: 5 GOCO, 5 Navy-run, 10 private = three comparative streams; prevents bottlenecks.
	•	5 new GoCo shipyards are in new workforce areas providing untapped labor options.
	•	Resilience: DLA keeps 21 shipsets in reserve plus a rotating repair/refit float, but prioritizes throughput (no idle yards).
	•	Steel Security: Federal loans ensure U.S. naval steel capacity expands without taxpayer-owned mills.
	•	Politics: 25–30 states benefit via GOCO, legacy, private, and ISO yards.
	•	Redundancy in case of vendor failure, weather, war access to multiple shipyards to continue building refitting ships throughout the TriSeadon program.
	•	Affordability: Net Federal spend ~$20B, easily absorbed by Navy’s $40–47B annual shipbuilding budget.
	•	Return: GOCO yards generate ~$400–600M/yr lease income; legacy yards lower per-hull costs; private/ISO/state campuses repay loans.

          

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