Cost and Funding Line

• 3 major GOCO yards: about $5.0B each, or about $15.0B total in federal capital for site control, remediation, heavy waterfront buildout, utilities, labs, and commissioning reserve.
• 4 existing GOGO yards: about $1.0B each, or about $4.0B total, for modernization, cleanup, training support, and one large TriSeadon lane per yard. The added TriSeadon spaces are intended for underused or recoverable yard areas so current submarine, carrier, overhaul, and decommissioning work is not interrupted. Recovery is expected through the lowest recurring cost per completed hull rather than direct lease revenue.
• COCO/private-yard expansion: up to $500M per yard, or about $2.5B-$5.0B depending on how many yards take the package. This is primarily federal loan exposure rather than pure grant outlay.
• 50-state state module-campus activations: up to $300M in core capital per campus built around up to $150M state share matched by up to $150M federal funds, with additional assistance available through hazmat, learning, union, VA, and related programs. State and federal shares split contractor lease/rent streams for the first 10 years, or until the initial public capital is recovered.

• GOCO recovery: the government owns the yard and leases operating space, lanes, labs, and industrial capacity to contractors. The site baseline elsewhere in the project assumes long-term lease/use revenue as the recovery stream.
• COCO recovery: private yards repay the federal loan package over time at 3% over 20 years after a Year-1 startup holiday.
• State module-campus recovery: state and federal shares split contractor lease/rent streams for the first 10 years, or until the initial public capital is recovered. After that, the state receives 100% of contractor lease/rent streams.
• Indirect recovery: lower recurring ship cost, higher throughput, reduced brownfield drag, stronger tax base, and preserved sovereign repair capacity are treated as real return even when they do not show up as a direct lease payment.

• GOCO and COCO: these have actual financial recovery channels through lease income and loan repayment.
• GOGO: these are not primarily revenue assets. Their return is mission readiness, sovereign repair depth, battle-damage recovery, avoidance of higher future recapitalization costs, and the least expensive cost per completed hull.
• State and module campuses: these sit in the middle, because part of the return is financial and part is industrial-policy return through remediation, jobs, stockpile depth, and distributed manufacturing resilience.
• Bottom line: the site should not imply every dollar comes back as cash. The stronger claim is that part of the program is directly recoverable and the rest buys long-life strategic capacity that the Navy is currently paying for inefficiently through delay, redesign, and shortage.

• FFG planning assumption: 500 ft OAL x 66 ft beam x about 10,000 tons full load, intentionally larger than today's Constellation so the hull can carry a quieter ASW-biased machinery layout, larger mission volume, and future growth margin.
• DDG planning assumption: 650 ft OAL x 88 ft beam x about 15,000 tons full load, above current Flight III Burke weight and broadly in the DDG(X) size band.
• CAG planning assumption: 800 ft OAL x 108 ft beam x about 32,000 tons full load, deliberately moving into heavy-cruiser scale for larger VLS volume, command spaces, aviation stability, and the Trinion gun system.
• Recurring cost logic depends on DLA bulk-buy leverage, module-campus pre-outfitting, reduced redesign churn, shared combat-system families, and controlled block upgrades instead of class-by-class reinvention.

Comparator figures are preliminary public-source snapshots and must be normalized to common-year dollars, procurement scope, learning curve, and quantity before decision use. See the source register.

• FFG historical role analog: the Perry class is a mission ancestor, but it was much smaller and is not a meaningful modern cost comparator.
• Current FFG comparator: FFG-62 Constellation is roughly 7,800-8,000 tons full load, with follow-on FY2026 procurement around $1.2B-$1.3B each and the lead ship around $1.5B.
• DDG historical/current line: Burke is the direct destroyer lineage reference. Flight III Burke is about 9,700 tons full load and currently around $2.7B per ship.
• DDG future comparator: DDG(X) is planned around 14,500 tons, with Navy estimates around $3.3B average per ship and CBO estimates around $4.4B average per ship.
• CAG historical role analog: Ticonderoga is the mission analog, but at about 9,600 tons full load it is far smaller than the TriSeadon CAG.
• CAG modern warning case: Zumwalt/DDG-1000 averaged roughly $4.3B procurement unit cost per ship and shows what happens when too many new systems are front-loaded into one hull.

These are program planning objectives, not independent cost estimates or promised prices. They exclude any category not expressly included in the underlying model and require Navy, CAPE, CBO, GAO, and shipyard validation.

• FFG (10,000 tons): about $1.25B early, trending toward about $1.0B-$1.1B once the yard network stabilizes.
• DDG (15,000 tons): about $2.5B early, trending toward about $2.0B-$2.2B if mature launchers, radars, turbines, and generators are reused instead of repeatedly redesigned.
• CAG (32,000 tons): about $6.0B early, trending toward about $4.5B-$5.0B if the ship remains a large but mostly conventional hull with phased technology insertion by flight.
• The planning hypothesis is not that larger ships are inherently inexpensive. It is that common standards, stronger supplier depth, controlled redesign, and reduced class-unique churn may improve lifecycle value. The hypothesis must be tested through independent estimating.